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Abstract
Estey, Clayton Joseph. M.S. The University of Memphis. August, 2015.
Schema Induction through Evaluation and Correction. Major Professor: Philip Pavlik Jr.
Schema induction occurs when people form mental representations of how to
organize and interpret information through learning generalities across multiple
events. An instructional intervention/task purported to enhance this process for students
is Schema Induction through Evaluation and Correction (SIEC, aka “Text Editing”),
whereby students label problems based on their structural quality and edit their flaws
away if necessary. We compared the relative learning efficiency of a SIEC condition
with a conventional problem solving condition using word-problems one would find
in basic probability theory. In a randomized control design with a large and diverse
internet sample, we found SIEC to offer no advantage over the control in preparing
participants for a problem solving posttest, both in terms of relative learning efficiency
and raw pretest-posttest gains. The results and their implications are discussed.
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Schema Induction through Evaluation and Correction
As shown in the seminal paper by Gick and Holyoak (1983), “schema induction,”
whereby students develop mental representations of concepts/problems through
transferring knowledge across learning events, may be a way to realize the learning of
complex procedures. During schema induction, students progressively transfer their
knowledge across similar and dissimilar learning events and begin to abstract which
concepts/rules are relevant and which ones are not. The terms “progressive abstraction”
(e.g., Cameron, 1993) and “concreteness fading” (e.g., McNeil & Fyfe, 2012) are
additional labels, both capturing a different perspective on the same process, because
increasing abstraction implies decreasing concreteness in the same learning context.
The basis behind schema induction is analogical reasoning. More specifically,
schema induction is a consequence of matching features across stimuli/events, forming
relations among these features (forming analogies), then forming inferences based on the
regularities found across stimuli/events (e.g., Genter, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003).
The mental conception of the regularity (i.e., the features and their relations learned
across stimuli/events) is termed the “schema,” and the inferences we make given such
schemas are based on what is relevant or irrelevant to that schema’s implementation.
Interestingly enough, this makes the process of schema induction very similar to, if not
the same as, modern thinking on category/concept induction1. In a review (Ross, Taylor,
Middleton, & Nokes, 2008), the author notes more modern conceptions of
concept/category learning incorporate both features and non-trivial relationships between

1

Ross (2008) clarifies that concepts are mental representations people use to pick out a
class of entities, while categories are the class of entities the concept targets. Despite this, we will
use these terms interchangeably given there is no difference between a concept and an abstract
“meta-category” under these definitions.
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them, reflecting the learning of more complex, realistic categories/concepts. Ross also
notes past views concentrated on categorical membership and inference only being based
on features while ignoring relations among them. This conception of categories was
likely due to relying on simplistic laboratory stimuli. Indeed, the modern view is
identical to the process outlined above with schema induction—it is the features and their
relationships learned over time that characterizes a schema and subsequent inference
using that schema.
This means when someone speaks about learning schemas, it is safe to assume
they are talking about the learning of categories whereby the relationships among the
features are important in representing and using the categories. Given the above
clarifications and ties with category/concept learning, the present proposal thus concerns
getting people to learn the proper relations among key features in problems. This would
occur through trial-by-trial analogical reasoning and knowledge transfer and properly
applying the induced schema (i.e., concept).
The research on theoretical contributions to schema induction principles and their
applications in education have offered notable extensions of the Gick and Holyoak (1983)
study and the processes outlined in Genter and colleagues (2003). In a study
investigating positive and negative transfer among items of varying concreteness (i.e.,
specific versus abstract schema conditions) and later impact on problem solving, Chen
and Daehler (1989) showed both the learning of an abstract (problem general) problem
solving schema and knowing when to apply that schema were necessary for positive
transfer, because while abstract schemas were necessary for positive transfer, participants
failed to transfer toward problems with solution principles different from training.
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Before this study it was less clear what role schema induction played in positive transfer
and what the limitations were for that transfer to occur. Ten years later in a study varying
specific solution procedures while holding the solutions themselves constant, Chen
(1999) found participants were more likely to develop general problem solving schemas
and use them appropriately when procedures to be learned varied across learning trials,
compared to the procedures staying the same. Those in the varying procedure condition
also showed positive transfer toward novel problems with unfamiliar procedural content.
In a later study refining Chen’s (1999) prior findings with procedural variation but adding
the component of different dimensions within word problems (e.g., story lines, formulas,
etc. are each “dimensions”) and if schema induction was dimension specific versus
general, Chen and Mo (2004) found that exposure to varying procedures across learning
trials led to slower initial learning, but more flexible schemas, whereas vice versa
occurred when procedures varied less. This replicated the prior finding with procedural
variation. Additionally, they also found schema induction was dimension specific. This
refers to positive transfer only existing along the same dimension participants were
trained in.
There has also been considerable interest in “schema-based instruction” and
“schema training” with studies consistently showing learning gains compared to nonschema based practice in the target domain (e.g., Fuchs et al., 2004; Jitendra & Hoff,
1996; Jitendra et al., 2009; Robins & Mayer, 1993; Xin, 2008). In addition to
refinements and applications, there was a change in terminology in at least one research
group when referring to schema induction (“relational schema induction,” “relational
schema theory”—Halford, Bain, Maybery, & Andrews, 1998; Halford & Busby, 2007).
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This change perhaps explicates the fact schema induction is analogical and relational in
mechanism and better focuses new readers to the core aspects of schema induction, but
the psychological processes outlined in their studies do not differ from prior thinking
about schema induction and investigations thereof.
Given the reasons why schema induction occurs, and past success in applying
these principles for learning how to solve problems, it should be possible to get students
to understand what the “deeper structures” of problems are while disregarding erroneous,
surface level details, as this is the trademark distinction between novices and experts in a
given problem solving domain (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981). In terms of schema
induction, the “deeper structure” is the parts of a problem instantiating a target concept,
and the desired schema to be learned would be the students’ internalization/modeling of
either the concept itself or a problem solving strategy given that concept. All other
information in a problem would be seen as irrelevant by an expert, and would be
superficial details at best and deceptive details at worst for a novice.
To implement the above concepts and investigate schema induction, we have
chosen the task of “text editing,” whereby students label problems according to their
solvability and relevance of the content, then edit the problem to remove its flaws (e.g.,
Birney, Fogarty, & Plank, 2005; Low & Over, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993; Low, Over,
Doolan, & Michell, 1994; Ngu, Low, & Sweller, 2002; Ngu & Yeung, 2013). The goal
of text editing is to increase knowledge of, and attention toward, a problem’s deeper
structure. Increasing this knowledge and attention allows the learner to better understand
the components of the problem most relevant to problem solving rules. In text editing,
students label a problem as sufficient when there is no irrelevant information and the
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problem is solvable, irrelevant when it is solvable but there is superficial/deceptive
information, and missing when there is not enough information to solve the problem.
Should a student answer correctly in that the problem is either irrelevant or missing, they
are then asked which aspects to edit (i.e., add or delete) to make the problem sufficient.
Through classifying word problems in text editing tasks, the literature above
claims students are led to focus on which features of problems are irrelevant and which
ones are crucial in order to apply a concept the problem instantiates (e.g., a math problem
might instantiate a compound interest concept). If a student knows why an irrelevant
information problem should be classified as such, then they can learn to ignore related
features in subsequent problems, encouraging the student to not let superficial details
influence their problem solving. A student might also eliminate the misconception that
an irrelevant detail is actually part of the problem solving procedure. If a student knows
why a missing information problem should be classified as such, then they can learn to
focus on the features necessary for reaching a correct solution, and thus incorporate this
information in their problem solving. This contrasts with conventional practice, whereby
students learn procedures for solving problems without explicit feature reinforcement or
addressing misconceptions about the “deeper structure” of problems. Indeed,
conventional practice is typically cited in this literature as resulting in lower problem
solving performance in posttest (compared to text editing) for these reasons (e.g., Birney
et al., 2005).
Precisely how the editing process itself (removing irrelevant information and
adding necessary information) interacts with the mechanisms of schema induction was
never the focus of this more applied literature, and is therefore less understood. While an
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elaborate hypothetical is possible relating the mechanisms of schema induction to the
editing process, the editing may or may not add more to the students’ problem solving
performance than what is accomplished through the classification stage alone. After all,
if a student classifies correctly, then they likely already have schematic knowledge of the
deeper problem structure, with the editing stage being redundant. Delineating the
contributions of these two stages of text editing toward problem solving performance on
posttest would make for an interesting empirical investigation, but the focus of the
present study was to test text editing as it had been used in the literature.
Although “text editing” is a name consistently used throughout the literature cited,
this name does not clearly convey the process just described. For example, upon hearing
about text editing, a researcher would likely think “Oh, I thought it was referring to
something like editing a paper.” To prevent this confusion, we will be referring to this
“text editing” by a label we view as better reflecting the underlying learning
phenomenon, Schema Induction through Evaluation and Correction (SIEC). SIEC is
purported in the literature to be robust across domains, including algebra (Low & Over,
1990), geometry (Low & Over, 1992), and basic probability theory (Birney et al., 2005).
Some researchers in the literature even claim this approach can increase problem solving
ability when there is no practice solving problems during training (Low et al., 1994; Ngu
et al., 2002; Ngu & Yeung, 2013). This might be a very counterintuitive claim for many
and thus will be one of the claims tested in the present study. Although the domain of
chemistry holds up to this pattern (Ngu et al., 2002; Ngu & Yeung, 2013), SIEC was
shown to not work for stoichiometry problems (Ngu et al., 2002; Ngu & Yeung, 2013).
One reason for the aforementioned result regarding stoichiometry problems is that SIEC
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is only beneficial when it enables students to attend to a problem’s underlying concepts-through fully representing the concepts in the word problem as textual information. This
is not possible for stoichiometry problems which do not contain direct textual
representations of concepts needed for problem solving.
However, Ngu and Yeung (2013) also demonstrated that seeing worked examples
not only outperformed SIEC in the contexts it can be used in, but that it also increased
domain knowledge in the contexts where SIEC is ineffective. The curious reader may
wonder why anyone should study SIEC when there is a better alternative. We argue for
the possibility that their study was an inadequate test of SIEC. In their discussion
section, they speculated the performance of the SIEC group could better rival the worked
examples group if SIEC were used in feedback during initial learning of problem solving
for the SIEC group, and no feedback was provided during training in their study nor in
Ngu et al. (2002) for the above type of problems. Therefore, their study may not
invalidate SIEC as an intervention, as their findings regarding stoichiometry problems
could represent exceptions to the norm for SIEC.
Despite our paper up to this point illustrating SIEC, there are issues in interpreting
the literature. All studies were in school settings and varied on key factors possibly
related to posttest performance (see Birney et al., 2005; Low & Over, 1989, 1990, 1992,
1993; Low et al., 1994; Ngu et al., 2002; Ngu & Yeung, 2013). These factors include
school location, the amount of delay between pretest and intervention, whether a pretest
or random assignment occurred, and other qualitative discrepancies making interpreting
the findings difficult. Our study was the first to test SIEC under laboratory conditions.
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In addition to laboratory replication, we addressed the literature’s claim that SIEC can be
effective despite lack of practice problem solving during training.
The final experiment targeted learning efficiency. In past investigations of SIEC,
the researchers held time constant across groups so as to eliminate time as a factor.
While this design is intuitive and usually appropriate, doing so limits investigations into
the potential of one learning approach versus another. For example, if one approach
yielded greater learning gains while students spent longer time learning, and students
spent much less time learning under an alternative approach for slightly less gains, then
such a time discrepancy could have been informative in determining the relative worth of
these approaches. Thus, we also addressed whether or not SIEC training results in more
efficient learning outcomes (pre-post gains) compared to conventional practice. We
operationalized and justified a two-group learning efficiency measure in Appendix A. If
greater schematic knowledge resulted in better learning even without problem solving
practice as is claimed, such contributions might not have been as meaningful if the
needed intervention took longer, as that could have been time spent with additional
problem solving practice. The domain in which we investigated the above was basic
probability theory with items similar to Birney et al.’s (2005). Specifically, the items
were word problems pertaining to basic probability concepts with multiple choice
answers.
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Study 1
The purpose of the first study was to gather demographic information (see
Appendix B) and conventional problem solving pretest scores in a sample separate from
the main study (i.e., Study 2). One reason for having the pretest in a separate group from
the intervention and posttest was for participants to have enough time during learning and
posttest for the main study. However, the primary benefit was in eliminating carry-over
effects between pretest and intervention, thereby allowing direct inferences about how
performance was influenced only by the intervention and not due to interactions with
prior problem solving. Resolving this issue required using the demographics as
predictors in a model predicting pretest scores. Specifically, we input Study 2
demographic values into the model so each person in the Study 2 sample would have
their own synthetic pretest scores, with the scores serving as a covariate in explaining
posttest scores for Study 2.
Method
Participants
Eighty-one participants were recruited using the Mechanical Turk (MTurk)
service from Amazon, restricted to people over the age of 18 who reside in the U.S. and
speak fluent English. MTurk is an online labor market whereby people can be cheaply
paid for online tasks. Studies have shown MTurk is at least as reliable as, and more
generalizable than, undergraduate subject pool and conventional online samples for nonexperimental studies (e.g., Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011; Mason & Suri, 2012;
Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010) and recently, cognitive experiments (Crump,
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013). Participants were asked to provide informed consent
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before the study. This study was approved by the IRB and their compensation for
participating is below.
Participants were paid $0.10 for participating in the demographic surveys even if
they withdrew. In addition, they were paid $1 for attempting the pretest and even if they
withdrew before answering the first problem, they were still paid $1.10. They were
offered up to $1 in bonus based on their performance for correctly solving the problems
(which scaled according to their percentage score). Thus, participants had the potential to
earn $2.10.
Design, Materials, and Procedure
This study was a single group design with no conditions. We used the Fact and
Concept Training (FaCT) system, a computerized tutoring system for enhancing student
learning of concepts and facts (Pavlik Jr. et al., 2007). We also used the R statistical
programming language (R Development Core Team, 2011) for the analyses.
To mitigate self-selection bias for/against the topic, and thus skewed
demographics, the name of the task was content general (“Concept Learning”) despite the
task being mathematical. We hoped those with a prior bias against math were persuaded
by a reasonable economic incentive, which would exist even with poor performance
while increasing with better performance. Therefore, by the time they found out the task
was math-based, they would have already had this incentive in mind. Likewise, we
hoped to mitigate the influx of individuals with probability knowledge who would be
attracted to the study strictly because of the title and contribute to ceiling effects.
After the participants gave their consent, they were exposed to the demographic
survey, the items of which were randomized per participant to mitigate response bias via
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impressions from prior questions (see Appendix B). Then they were shown instructions
and expectations pertaining to the task. Appendix C contains the instructions and
expectations, concrete examples of problems and relevant feedback, and precisely
illustrated variations of such across conditions (latter is for Study 2). Then they were
exposed to 12 pretest problems with different numbers across problems, randomized per
participant. Each problem was multiple-choice with four answer options and only one
correct answer each. They were all a possible combination of 2(number of probability
concepts) X 3(sufficient, irrelevant, or missing information) X 2(each problem repeated
once with different numbers) which totaled 12 problems. Two answer options reflected
an answer applying a particular probability concept, one option was a distractor which
could never be correct for this study, and the other option reflected acknowledging a
problem could not be solved due to missing information.
Analyses
Iteratively re-weighted least squares (IWLS) multiple regression based on
bootstrap resampling of observations was used to model pretest scores using
demographic predictors. IWLS was chosen over the conventional, parametric ordinary
least squares (OLS) regression because other than the observations being independent,
the homoscedasticity of variances assumption for OLS was violated. The demographic
predictors were gender, age, general education attainment, math education attainment,
number of hours on average completing MTurk tasks (thus exposure to task practice in
general)2, and self-reported propensity to select math related tasks (desire for math
related tasks). The same method was also used to model the participants’ time-on-task
2

Operationalized by multiplying results of two constructs: average number of hours per
month completing MTurk tasks and number of months spent on MTurk. The result will be a
predictor with values from 1 to 36.

11

using the same predictors, as well as incorporating time-on-task as an additional predictor
in the former regression. In these latter two models, we wanted to determine if the time
participants spent on the study could be described well using their demographics, if their
times would add much more information about their performance than that provided by
their demographics alone, and how much this addition could change our inferences about
the other predictors. We thought about how behavioral economics issues with the
payment incentive could have affected performance on the pretest. Therefore, we
concluded it was best to control for this as best we could by incorporating time-on-task
into our inferences about pretest scores relative to the other predictors.
Results
After removing three outliers N = 78. The three were determined to be outliers
due to taking an abnormally long time on the task while also demonstrating low
performance. The average number of items correct was 5.96 out of 12 with SD = 2.36,
being slightly better than chance (3 out of 12). We also found that one of the initial
predictors (number of hours on MTurk a month) was consistently at the maximum value
(25+ hours) and therefore contributed no new information to the modeling. Therefore,
total hours of practice on MTurk was replaced with number of months on MTurk. For
below, the 95% confidence intervals are based on the lower and upper threshold
percentiles of the bootstrapped sampling distributions for the coefficients, the standard
error (SE) is based on the standard deviation of those distributions, and each β is the
average of their respective distribution. Non-significant predictors were kept in the
models because we observed that if they were to be excluded, the remaining coefficients
would have had larger values than would occur in adding this extra information into the
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model. Therefore, our inferences could have been unfairly biased had we removed nonsignificant predictors.
For the first model where pretest scores was the dependent variable being
modeled by demographics and excluding time-on-task (adjusted 𝑅 2 = 0.36): gender (β = 0.07 ; CI = [-0.55 , 0.44] ; SE = 0.26), age (β = 0.08 ; CI = [-0.16 , 0.32] ; SE = 0.12),
math education (β = 0.25 ; CI = [-0.09 , 0.54] ; SE = 0.16), general education (β = 0.23 ;
CI = [-0.05 , 0.52] ; SE = 0.15), months on MTurk (β = 0.18 ; CI = [-0.07 , 0.42] ; SE =
0.12), and preference for math related tasks (β = 0.34 ; CI = [0.11 , 0.57] ; SE = 0.11).
Thus in this model, preference for math related tasks had the only coefficient with an
interval excluding zero.
For the second model where time-on-task was the dependent variable being
modeled by demographics (adjusted 𝑅 2 = 0.13): gender (β = -0.15 ; CI = [-0.62 , 0.25] ;
SE = 0.22), age (β = 0.1 ; CI = [-0.1 , 0.34] ; SE = 0.11), math education (β = 0.26 ; CI =
[0.01 , 0.51] ; SE = 0.13), general education (β = -0.005 ; CI = [-0.22 , 0.23] ; SE = 0.11),
months on MTurk (β = -0.03 ; CI = [-0.24 , 0.19] ; SE = 0.11), and preference for math
related tasks (β = 0.22 ; CI = [0.07 , 0.51] ; SE = 0.11). Thus in this model, preference
for math related tasks had an interval excluding zero just as before, as does math
education’s interval. In terms of the model fit, only the former significant predictor had a
major sole contribution, as the model’s fit with this predictor removed was only adjusted
𝑅 2 = 0.074, so about 57% of the model’s fit, although low, is attributed to preference for
math related tasks alone.
Finally, for the first model but with time-on-task added (adjusted 𝑅 2 = 0.40):
gender (β = 0.009 ; CI = [-0.46 , 0.51] ; SE = 0.25), age (β = 0.06 ; CI = [-0.19 , 0.28] ;
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SE = 0.12), math education (β = 0.18 ; CI = [-0.16 , 0.48] ; SE = 0.17), general education
(β = 0.22 ; CI = [-0.06 , 0.52] ; SE = 0.15), months on MTurk (β = 0.19 ; CI = [-0.05 ,
0.44] ; SE = 0.12), preference for math related tasks (β = 0.27 ; CI = [0.03 , 0.49] ; SE =
0.11), and time-on-task (β = 0.26 ; CI = [0.05 , 0.48] ; SE = 0.11). The inclusion of timeon-task did not change which predictors were significant versus not, although the
coefficients for math education and preference for math related tasks did shrink
substantially more than the other predictors through adding the extra predictor. Still,
adding time-on-task only increased the adjusted 𝑅 2 by 0.04, suggesting this predictor
describes pretest performance very poorly relative to the other predictors.
These results suggest that participants’ use of time was insufficiently modeled.
Additionally, their use of time had less influence on pretest performance than qualities
reflected in their demographics (nor did it bias inferences about the other predictors to a
meaningful degree). The coefficient being positive suggests participants spending longer
time did not diminish performance on average. However, a positive coefficient could
still allow the possibility of some participants “rushing through” the study and getting
lower scores. Such a pattern was not consistently observed as there were participants
who spent much less time than others while getting similar scores.
Overall, performance on pretest was too poorly explained by the offered payment
incentive (if the time they spent on the task alone reflects such an incentive) and is more
likely due to attributes not measured. At least one missing key predictor of pretest
performance could be prior exposure to these particular types of probability questions
(and not math education in general). Although the total model fit seems less than the
ideal in the task of providing synthetic pretest scores for participants in Study 2, the fit
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was sufficient to suggest this method is probably the better of two main alternatives3 for
the purpose of comparing the pretest score average with the posttest averages of Study 2.
Additionally, as long as we can assume the coefficients for the model would be stable
across an additional sample from the same population, the model should still be sufficient
for the task of producing synthetic pretest scores. Through this method for eliminating
carryover, it was also much easier to constrain our inferences about what exactly led to
differences in posttest across groups in Study 2.
Study 2
Our goal for this study was to compare participants’ learning of probability
theory items with SIEC compared to a conventional problem solving control condition.
Given design and sampling discrepancies across past studies in the SIEC literature, we
had no adequate a priori hypothesis as to which condition would perform best on a
problem solving posttest. This study compared the raw difference in pretest-posttest gain
scores of the SIEC and control conditions before accounting for the potential differences
in learning time across groups. Afterward, the difference in learning efficiency was
compared across the groups.

3

The first alternative is having the pretest, intervention, and posttest in the same sample
but with the pretest and posttest items differing in their surface level details. This is the most
common alternative in cognitive/educational experiments. While this mitigates prior recognition
effects involving stimuli, some carryover still exists from prior practice before the intervention is
shown as there will always be important similarities between pretest and posttest. The second
alternative is much less common in research, but interactions between pretest, intervention, and
posttest can be modelled and the carryover at least be “explained away.” The issue here is
precisely explaining potential multilevel interactions and how they would affect the posttest could
be untenable, and the carryover never truly goes away. The present method used is subject to
sufficient model fitting, but otherwise shares none of these weaknesses.
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Method
Participants and Design
The 195 participants came from the same population as the first study.
Participants were asked to provide informed consent before the study. This study was
approved by the IRB and their compensation for participating follows. Participants were
paid $0.05 for participating in the pre-experiment demographic survey even when they
withdrew. In addition, they were paid $1.75 for attempting the experimental portion and
even if they withdrew before answering the first problem, they were still payed $1.80.
They were offered up to $1.90 in bonus based on their performance for correctly solving
the problems during the testing phase (scaled by their percentage score). Thus,
participants had the potential to earn $3.70.
The two between-subjects conditions were conventional problem solving (control)
and SIEC. The conditions were divided into the learning phase block (first block; for the
nominal factor) and the testing phase block (second block; for posttest performance),
with an eight minute break for participants between blocks. Conditions were randomly
assigned to participants as they entered the study.
Materials and Procedure
All of the items in Study 1 were used in Study 2. The procedure for Study 2 up
to but excluding the part where they were given instructions related to the task was
identical to that of Study 1 (i.e., the name of the study and the demographic survey). For
the control group, after the instructions they entered the learning phase and were
presented isomorphs of all the items in Study 1 in a randomized order. In the event they
answered incorrectly, they received feedback customized to the answer option they
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selected then went to the next problem. The feedback contained an affirmation that they
were incorrect and the solution procedure for the correct answer. If they answered
correctly, they moved on to the next problem without feedback. This continued until the
break. During the break, all participants viewed an eight minute mildly entertaining
video playlist of cats such as is common on the internet. This was to clear working
memory with an unrelated, entertaining stimulus while giving them rest between
sessions. After the break they entered the testing phase (posttest) and were presented
with all of the randomized items from Study 1 so changes in performance from pretest to
posttest could only be attributed to the intervention and not to changes in testing items
(i.e., identical; not isomorphic). The learning phase items being isomorphic to the testing
phase items prevented simple memorization as a strategy for Study 2 participants. This
allowed the Study 1 and Study 2 posttest items to be identical, and all of the learning
phase items for the control condition to be isomorphs of every Study 1/posttest item. The
total then was 12 pretest items, 12 learning phase items, and 12 posttest items.
For the SIEC group, the procedure leading up to the instructions was the same as
that of the control condition. After the instructions they entered the learning phase and
were presented a randomized order of SIEC items. Items in this condition either had one
step to complete or two steps, but neither involved practice problem solving at any step.4
The problems with “sufficient with no irrelevant information” as the correct answer were
the one-step problems as they did not need an editing step. For two-step problems, the
first step was in classifying the problem as a possible combination of sufficient,

4

The most that could be done to mitigate participants mentally problem solving to help
with the classification and editing tasks was to instruct them not to problem solve and only follow
the task directions. Given the answering options were not numeric and problem solving wasn’t
necessary to be correct, they should have been less likely to problem solve.
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irrelevant, or missing and there were four answer options. As before, one of the answer
options was a distractor which could never be correct for this study. The distractors were
answers which would result from applying an existing probability concept not in the
study. If they answered incorrectly in this step, they were given feedback specific to their
answer and moved on to the second step. The specific nature of the feedback on items in
this study can be found in Appendix C. More briefly, the feedback contained an
affirmation of correct/incorrect, followed by an elaboration on why the affirmation was
so, and then concluding with an illustration of the solution procedure. If they answered
correctly, they also went to the second step but without feedback. In the second step they
classified what aspect of the problem needed to be changed so it could be re-classified as
sufficient with no irrelevant information, which also had four answer options. If they
answered the second step correctly or incorrectly they were given customized feedback
and moved on to the next problem. For one-step problems only the first step occurred
and they moved to the next problem after completion.
The one-step items in this condition had a feedback structure similar to the
learning items in the control group (all of which were one-step problems), except
problems in this condition also gave feedback illustrating a solution procedure even when
they answered correctly. Illustrating the solution steps in a declarative manner allowed
this type of feedback to be held constant across SIEC and control groups. This ensured it
was not the absence of a solution procedure in the SIEC group’s feedback that was
responsible for different outcomes. This process continued until the break which was the
same as that of the control condition. The posttest was the same as that of the control
condition.
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Results
After removing 19 observations with incomplete number of trials and some
entering the study in one group then re-entering into the other group, N = 81 for the SIEC
group and N = 95 for the control group for a total N = 176. The average number of
posttest items correct for SIEC was 7.73 out of 12 with SD = 3.26. For the control group,
the number was 7.56 out of 12 with SD = 3.23. The average number of synthetic pretest
items correct for SIEC was 4.77 out of 12 and the mean of the prediction standard error
was 2.47. For the control group, the average was 5.48 out of 12 and the mean of the
prediction standard error was 2.46. The average learning time duration for SIEC was
17.67 minutes with SD = 3.71. For the control group, the duration was 9.35 minutes with
SD = 4.5. For comparing the mean posttest items correct, a two-sided t-test based on
unequal N and equal variances assumed showed a non-significant difference in means (t
= 0.35 ; df = 174 ; p = 0.729). To determine if the non-significance was due to low N
versus a trivial mean difference actually existing, we examined the 95% confidence
interval for the above test (CI = [-0.8, 1.14]), with the precision of the interval suggesting
the sample size was large enough to determine it was the effect difference that was “nonsignificant” as opposed to there being insufficient data.
To determine if the above non-significance extended to the difference in learning
efficiency (DLE) statistic, an approximate permutation test5 was conducted to compare
the learning efficiency of the two groups. These results were also non-significant (DLE =

5

We generated an empirical sampling distribution for the statistic under the null
hypothesis, and then the observed value was compared to its null distribution to calculate a p
value.

19

-0.746 ; p = 0.19) along with there being a significant difference in the learning phase
time across groups (t = 13.25 ; df = 174 ; p < 0.0001). These findings suggest that the
difference in learning efficiency between conditions being non-significant is due to the
prior finding that the raw posttest differences themselves were trivial. Additionally, the
triviality of the mean difference outweighed the significant difference in time spent in the
learning phase in determining learning efficiency.
Based on the above findings, however, it was still possible that the non-significant
raw difference was largely mediated by prior aptitude (i.e., synthetic pretest), with pretest
scores predicting posttest performance differently across groups. Additionally, it was
still unclear if minute demographic differences across studies interacting with the group
factor would have explained the minute, non-significant difference in posttest. Therefore,
a between subjects ANCOVA was conducted with synthetic pretest as the continuous
covariate, the conditions as the nominal factor, and their interaction. If the interaction
term was found to be significant, then this would be evidence of the intervention
behaving differently for participants with differing initial performance. The interaction
was found to be non-significant (F = 1.89 ; df = 1 ; p = 0.17). Just as expected from the
prior t-test results, the group main effect was still found to be non-significant (F = 2.32 ;
df = 1; p = 0.13). However, the synthetic pretest main effect was found to be significant
(F = 23.7 ; df = 1; p < 0.0001). The interaction term being non-significant suggests that
prior aptitude differences across groups minimally effected SIEC and the control. The
group main effect being non-significant while the pretest main effect being significant

The number would be interpreted as “the SIEC condition was 0.74 items less efficient in
pre-post gains than the control condition given the discrepancy in learning time averages across
groups relative to the grand learning time average across the groups.”
6
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suggests that, after accounting for synthetic pretest and the demographics producing
them, one group did not show an advantage over the other.
Lastly, we wanted to determine if it was solely the posttest stimuli that were
responsible for the non-significant difference or if the findings were due to effects of the
intervention and control groups interacting with the stimuli as intended. If only the
stimuli were responsible, then we would expect a non-significant difference between
pretest and posttest for both groups since the pretest and posttest stimuli were identical.
After running two one-tailed paired-sample t-tests, statistically significant results were
found for SIEC synthetic pretest-posttest gains (t = 9.2 ; df = 80 ; p < 0.0001) and the
same for the control group (t = 6.4 ; df = 94 ; p < 0.0001). These results suggest it was
not issues in the stimuli alone that were responsible for the null finding. Instead, it is
more likely interactions between stimuli and learning phase factors in Study 2 during
and/or after the learning phases that caused the null difference.
Discussion
Our goal was to investigate the problem solving posttest performance produced
from SIEC compared to the same for a conventional problem solving control group. In
doing so we addressed both differences in raw posttest scores as well as the potential
difference in learning efficiency. We obtained null results for both raw posttest
difference and learning efficiency difference, and we performed follow-up analyses
clarifying the most likely possibilities for these findings. Overall, the sample size was
large enough to determine the null result from comparing raw posttest mean difference
was due to a genuinely trivial difference in the posttest means between SIEC and control
groups instead of there not being enough data to reject a true null hypothesis, and that this
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finding resulted from circumstances during/after the Study 2 learning phases. This
inference took into account whether or not initial aptitude during pretest interacted with
the group factor as well as the possibility minor demographic differences across groups
affected the minute difference in posttest means. Additionally, there was also a nonsignificant difference found in the learning efficiency across groups and that this nondifference was mostly mediated by the trivial difference in posttest means (since SIEC
taking nearly twice as long in its learning phase as the control group still failed to yield a
significant difference in learning efficiency). For this reason, we concentrate primarily
on the raw mean differences instead of the learning time differences in our discussion.
From the results, we reason there is evidence of there being no difference between
SIEC and conventional problem solving for this sample, and not that there is just no
evidence of a difference, and that this non difference is due to either confounding or
legitimate circumstances beginning in the Study 2 learning phases. Below we clarify five
considerations and then offer a summary opinion as to why the posttest means converged
to similar numbers given key similarities in the feedback and stimuli, yet with the
learning task being so qualitatively different. These considerations are more broadly:
Similarities in feedback across groups, the pretest coming from an independent sample,
the nature of the stimuli, the conditions performing as expected without other issues, and
the time duration of the learning phase for both groups.
First is the consideration that in the feedback for the SIEC condition, participants
being told the procedure to solve the problems could have been what pushed the SIEC
group’s posttest scores toward equality with the control group’s scores, with the SIEC
group otherwise having lower posttest scores than the control. Given this, even though
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participants were instructed not to practice problem solving, the statements alone could
have been enough to achieve the observed pretest-posttest differences. This would make
the posttest results be an artifact of them being told how to solve the problem. If this
circumstance is what happened, it would still be evidence against SIEC being better than
problem solving for these types of learning items. Seeing the solution procedures was
likely itself a form of schematic reinforcement, making the text editing task of the SIEC
condition redundant. Such schematic reinforcement would be due to the solution
procedure illustrating the necessary and sufficient information for solving, along with the
features of the problem pertaining to that information.
The second consideration is a consequence of giving the pretest to a separate
sample from the intervention and posttest sample. Although this aspect of the research
design is unorthodox, we explained why it would result in less confounded inference
about the posttest scores. Namely, it prevents carry-over effects allowing more direct
comparisons of group factors in producing posttest scores. By far the greatest initial
concern with this design approach was the demographic variation across studies
influencing the results more than the study itself. Specifically, the predictors could have
interacted with learning phase performance differently across groups, and that minor
differences in demographics could have somehow unfairly pushed posttest-differences
toward equality. Such an objection would be unsubstantiated, both because the
interaction term from our ANCOVA results show evidence to the contrary and the fact
the posttest means were so close together despite the qualitative differences in the
learning task across groups. A possible objection is that our synthetic pretest scores came
from a model with lower than ideal fit for our data and, therefore, any analyses involving
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such scores may not be trustworthy. The main effect of synthetic scores in our
ANCOVA model being significant, however, instead illustrates the synthetic scores
worked quite well for the task of explaining posttest scores while controlling for pretest
performance.
The third consideration pertains to the structure of the stimuli themselves, instead
of the feedback involving said stimuli. Out of the studies researching text editing, ours is
the first to allow participants to acknowledge a problem’s insolvability by answering
“this problem cannot be solved” if that were true. This addition allows participants to
reveal some baseline declarative schematic knowledge of the problem before being
exposed to declarative schematic feedback in the SIEC condition, while allowing
participants in the control condition to do the same despite not receiving SIEC feedback.
As will be seen, however, the impact this design decision had for our study was likely
negligible. The pretest and posttest stimuli were identical and thus both had these
answering options. Yet, a highly statistically significant difference was found between
pretest and posttest for both groups while no difference was found between posttests for
both groups, despite good power of the test.
The fourth consideration is that the SIEC and control groups were behaving as
planned with the task dynamics prescribed to the groups, except they happened to yield
the same performance in posttest. Without further empirical study, we cannot know if
this consideration is more plausible than the first—with the solution procedure being
illustrated at the end of both SIEC and control group feedback. We assume the first
consideration is at least more useful for the sake of discussion, as it appeals to a tangible,
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directly observed aspect of the design as opposed to a more speculative, albeit possible,
coincidental similarity in performance.
The final consideration pertains to intentionally limiting the learning time based
on practicality in minimizing attrition rates for a population without institutional
pressures to stay in the study. This contrasts with a classroom setting which would better
reflect reality in the length of time a student has to learn the material, despite then having
less control over potential confounds that could occur given the increased span of time
before posttest. Even though the duration of the learning phase for the SIEC group was
nearly double that of the control group, in an absolute sense 18 minutes on average for
SIEC learning phase is insignificant compared to days, weeks, or months as could be seen
in a classroom-oriented research design. It could be possible that SIEC’s effects could be
demonstrated as superior to the control only through longer time scales, despite the
control condition being subject to that same time scale. The declarative illustration of the
solution procedure across groups could have a more substantial impact in their schematic
learning under lesser durations, while the classification and editing steps of SIEC become
more important under greater durations. The influence of these factors cannot be known
until a controlled classroom-oriented study is implemented.
Given the above considerations, what most likely caused the SIEC and control
groups to have equal performance on posttest is that in the learning phases, the 12 wordproblems (including their numbers) they were exposed to were the same (so only the task
and not the content differed), as was how they were told the procedures to solve the
problems (after the elaborative feedback in the case of SIEC). This equality between
groups was found despite not needing to arrive at a numeric answer in the SIEC group’s
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learning phase. This cannot be attributed to the stimuli absent activity in the learning
phase because there was still a difference found between pretest and posttest for both
groups with the same items. Therefore, it seems that it was solely exposure to the
structural features of the problems and the procedural feedback together (even without
practice problem solving) that were needed by the participants, and that for our set of
learning items and the time constraints provided, SIEC was redundant in preparing them
for posttest. The procedural component of the feedback most likely provided all of the
necessary information about solving the problem during posttest, through sufficiently
displaying the relationships between key statements, key numbers, and the operations
between them.
There are several contributions this study adds to the SIEC literature (e.g., Birney
et al., 2005; Low & Over, 1989, 1990, 1992, 1993; Low et al., 1994; Ngu et al., 2002;
Ngu & Yeung, 2013), both in the results and in its design. To start, the finding of a null
difference between SIEC and conventional problem solving practice groups in posttest,
while having a large sample size for this null difference, is a new contribution. Although
it was unknown a priori which condition would outperform the other (given the
aforementioned qualitative discrepancies across studies), we were not expecting there to
be no difference in raw performance or in learning efficiency. The closest to this finding
the literature achieved so far was in showing SIEC’s ineffectiveness in two key
applications, although with caveats our study at least partially took into consideration.
These applications are for (1) posttest differences between SIEC and conventional
practice with stoichiometry problems favoring conventional practice (Ngu et al., 2002;
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Ngu & Yeung, 2013) and (2) for Ngu and Yeung’s (2013) finding that a worked
examples condition outperformed the SIEC condition for those same types of problems.
In the first application, SIEC’s ineffectiveness was attributed to stoichiometry
problems not containing direct textual representations of the needed problem solving
concepts. In the second application, Ngu and Yeung (2013) speculated the performance
of the SIEC group could better rival the worked examples group if SIEC were used in
feedback during initial learning of problem solving for the SIEC group, and no feedback
was provided during training in their study nor in Ngu and colleagues (2002) for the
above type of problems. In our study, we did have stimuli containing direct textual
representations of the concepts needed for problem solving, while also providing
feedback during training in both conditions. Although using worked examples and/or
stoichiometry problems were beyond the scope of our study, we did at least add their
considerations into our design. Yet, we still found SIEC to be ineffective in our study
compared to a conventional problem solving control group.
The second contribution our study provided was attempting to replicate the
claim that SIEC is more effective than conventional problem solving practice (except for
stoichiometry problems) even without problem solving training during learning in the
SIEC conditions for those studies (see Low et al., 1994; Ngu et al., 2002; Ngu & Yeung,
2013). There was no training in problem solving in our SIEC condition and we were
unable to replicate findings supporting that claim, due to our null difference. Although
we could not directly observe the behaviors of our participants, we assume they did not
problem solve because doing so was not required to answer the problems and they were
given instructions to only classify and edit them, as would be done with SIEC. Even if,
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hypothetically, people on average in the SIEC condition did problem solve without our
knowledge, we would expect that to increase their performance in interacting with the
SIEC condition. Yet, the result was still a null difference, so our findings contradict their
claim. It is still unclear if their claim resulted from students practicing problem solving
while outside the learning phase because the extra unmonitored time of a classroomdesign allows such to take place, or if the claim resulted from true assumptions on their
part and our demonstration of SIEC’s ineffectiveness was due to a methodological reason
unrelated to the lack of problem solving in our SIEC condition. Without a classroomdesign allowing researchers to perhaps document student studying habits after the pretest
and before posttest (coded to be a covariate controlling for discrepancies in study habits
across groups), it is difficult to resolve these issues.
Our study also attempted to not only replicate findings supporting the prior
discussed claim, but our study can also be seen as an attempt at extending the findings of
Birney and colleagues (2005) for the same subject domain using nearly identical stimuli
(basic probability theory). Our study’s emphasis on how to test participants’ schematic
knowledge in this domain, however, was different. In their approach to assessing
schematic knowledge, they provided a workbook to students with three sections. Section
1 was the SIEC section, section 2 pertained to classifying pairs of problems as similar vs.
different, and section 3 was the problem solving section where students solved for
numerical answers. Then they correlated accuracy in the first two sections with accuracy
in problem solving for numeric answers (section 3), with high vs. low correlations
suggesting high vs. low schematic knowledge. Sections 1 and 3 showed a strong
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correlation (r = 0.62 ; p < 0.001) while sections 2 and 3 showed a weak one (r = 0.25 ; p
< 0.05). This was taken as evidence of the SIEC section performing best.
The fact that the above element of their study was within-subjects, however,
means their results may be sensitive to the order in which items or conditions are
presented, as well as the role interactions between the sections could have played in
altering what would have been the true relationships between the conditions and the
solution test. In testing SIEC in this domain, we controlled for ordering effects and
separated conditions allowing for a less confounded inference about SIEC’s role in
producing schematic knowledge compared to a control group. We found conventional
practice, with feedback illustrating the solution steps, was sufficient to produce schematic
knowledge beyond baselines and SIEC offered no additional advantage.
Finally, our attempt to measure the difference in learning efficiency across groups
for SIEC vs. conventional practice offers a new methodological tool for future studies
reviewing this literature to investigate instructional differences while allowing time to
vary across conditions. Allowing time to vary allows task dynamics of differing
complexity (such as what occurs for SIEC vs. conventional practice) to be compared in
full without placing artificial constraints on those dynamics for the sake of keeping time
equal. Although we failed to find a significant difference in learning efficiency due to the
near equality in posttest means, past conclusions about SIEC’s efficacy might have been
altered had past studies used such a measure and allowed learning time to vary.
Conclusion
This paper offered a randomized-control design without order effects nor
erroneous carry-over effects, a diverse and large sample of participants spanning the U.S.
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who vary in their mathematical ability and feedback during learning which appropriately
illustrates the differing task dynamics of the conditions while still allowing for a fair
comparison of conditions. Such “fairness” comes into play when the conventional
problem solving group is illustrated the solution procedure, as we would expect to happen
in a classroom despite our study not being a classroom research-design. Illustrating the
solution procedure at the end of the feedback for the SIEC condition allowed us to
control for that element of feedback in light of participants being exposed to the full
SIEC task dynamics beforehand. At least for the subject domain of basic probability
theory with multiple choice answers, we found SIEC to offer no advantage over
conventional practice in enhancing problem solving performance, which stands in
contrast to the literature’s findings in domains where problems can contain direct textual
representations of problem solving concepts as is required for SIEC to be effective (e.g.,
such as in basic probability theory (Birney et al., 2005) and geometry (Low & Over,
1992).
We conclude with some comments about a couple of our study’s weaknesses.
The most obvious is one of generalizability to school settings where the conditions we
were investigating would be implemented. Despite our conditions’ feedback being
realistic, the time constraints imposed on participants’ learning may lead to alternative
explanations due to those constraints, such as SIEC possibly yielding better outcomes
over greater time intervals while falling short of its potential merits in the short term our
study provides. We find this to be a viable possibility and one to be remedied in future
research with a similar design except within a classroom. The second weakness is the
multiple choice nature of the stimuli. Although we showed the stimuli themselves were
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not solely responsible for our findings, past studies did allow open ended problem solving
to arrive at a correct solution and to show their attempted solution steps to the
researchers. Such a consideration would have allowed us to determine if SIEC
influenced what participants reported in their solution procedures. Accounting for this in
the future could yield a finer-grained investigation into SIEC’s effects on how students
reason with key statements in problems to arrive at a solution.
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Appendix A
There already exist metrics for “instructional efficiency” (e.g., Van Gos & Paas,
2008) and learning efficiency for pretest-posttest differences based on Z-scores of both
normalized gain and time spent learning (e.g., Wylie, Koedinger, & Mitamura, 2009).
The latter is only appropriate for within subjects studies and is standardized by SD (see
Baguley, 2009 for the issues with SD standardizing), and therefore inappropriate for our
goals. The former, although allowing comparisons across groups and therefore similar to
what we attempted, standardizes by SD and incorporates constructs requiring additional
theoretical assumptions and complicated measurements (e.g., incorporating “mental
effort”). Our measure will be based solely on theory-free, easily obtained information
(i.e., time) applicable even to those outside human factors/cognitive load research.
To reconcile these issues we propose the following metric. For a between groups,
pretest-learning-posttest design, let 𝐼 and 𝐴 be the intervention and the alternative
conditions, respectively. Then, let 𝐿_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 be the average time spent in the learning
phase. Finally, let 𝐿_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 be the average of the two averages to standardize average
learning times with respect to the grand average across groups. The metric is defined as:
(𝐼𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐼𝑃𝑟𝑒 ) (𝐴𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 − 𝐴𝑃𝑟𝑒 )
𝐷𝐿𝐸(𝐼, 𝐴) = 𝐿_𝐴𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 (
−
)
𝐼𝐿_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
𝐴𝐿_𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒
where DLE is “Difference in Learning Efficiency” and the absolute7 gain scores are the
average gains across participants in a group.

7

Normalized gains were not included because when posttest is 100% and gain is positive,
gain = (100 - pre)/(100 - pre) = 1. Therefore, no matter the pretest score, improvement is
impossible to ascertain. Absolute gain scores offer interpretations for all posttest scores.
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Appendix B
Which gender do you most closely identify as? If another gender identity better describes
you, select “other.”
a. Male
b. Female
c. Other
What is your age (years)?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

18-24
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
65+

What is the highest degree or level of school you have completed? If you are within 6
months of completing a particular level, choose that one instead.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

No schooling completed
8th grade
High School or equivalent (for example: GED)
Trade/technical/vocational training
Associates degree
Bachelor’s degree
Master’s degree
Doctorate degree

How long have you been on Mechanical Turk (months)?
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Less than a month
1-6
6-12
12-18
18-24
25+

On average, about how many hours per month have you spent completing HITs on
Mechanical Turk? If you have been on Mechanical Turk for less than a month, just
answer how many hours.
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a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

Less than an hour
1-6
6-12
12-18
18-24
25+

What is the highest level of math you have completed? If you are within 2 months of
completing a particular course, choose that one instead.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.

No math courses taken
No math beyond Middle School Algebra
High School level Algebra
College level Algebra
College level Pre-Calculus 1
College level Pre-Calculus 2
College level Calculus 1
I have taken math beyond Calculus 1

Which is the closest to describing how you spend your time on Mechanical Turk when it
comes to HITs involving math? If you have limited exposure to math HITs, answer
based on how you would spend your time.
a.
b.
c.
d.

I always avoid them
I typically avoid them unless given another incentive
I participate in them like I would any other HIT
If it’s a decision between a math and non-math HIT, assuming they would pay
about the same, I usually choose the math one
e. I only seek out HITs involving math
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Appendix C
Instructions for Study 1 as it appeared (including indents and spacing):
Before Demographics
“The study you’re participating should last around 30 minutes. First, you’ll be
asked several demographic related questions. In answering these, you’d type the letter
matching the answer best describing you. For example, if the question asks about your
age and “b” reflects the age interval describing you, you’d press “b.” After this you’ll be
given the final set of instructions on what to expect from the problems you’ll solve.”
After Demographics and Before Pretest
“Each problem you’ll be given has 4 multiple choice answer options with only
one correct answer, and you’ll type in a letter for the correct answer just like before.
Carefully read the problems as they may contain irrelevant information. One of the
answer options will always be “This problem can’t be solved.” This means there’s either
not enough information in the problem for solving, or there is enough information for
solving, but multiple answers are possible due to key information being missing. You’re
encouraged to grab a sheet of scratch paper and not to simplify your answers. As you
won’t be given feedback after each answer, you should do the best you can. Thank you
for your participation!”

Instructions for Study 2 Control group:
Before Demographics
[Same as above except they’re told the study should last around 60 minutes]

After Demographics and Before Learning Phase
[Same as above except “If you get a problem wrong you’ll receive feedback
customized to your answer. Once this task is completed, you’ll see a link to a mildly
entertaining 8-minute video. Watch the video then immediately return to this window
and follow the final set of instructions.”]
After Learning Phase and Before Testing Phase
“Now you’ll be tested on what you learned from prior practice. This final set of
problems will be similar to before except there won’t be feedback this time, so do the
best you can. Thank you for your participation!”
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Instructions for Study 2 SIEC group:
Before Demographics
[Same as above]
After Demographics and Before Learning Phase
“Each problem you’ll be given has 4 multiple choice answer options with only
one correct answer, and you’ll type in a letter for the correct answer just like before.
Carefully read the problems as they may contain irrelevant information. In this task
you’ll classify each problem based on its statements and you won’t use procedures to
solve for an answer like you’d expect in a math course. If there’s either not enough
information in the problem to solve for any answer, or there is enough information for
solving but multiple answers are possible due to key information being missing, then the
problem has missing information. If there’s deceptive or redundant information in the
problem then the problem has irrelevant formation. If the problem is solvable, whether
or not it has irrelevant information, then the problem is sufficient. You’ll receive
feedback after you answer. If the problem contains missing and/or irrelevant information
and you’re correct about that, you’ll then be given a follow-up problem asking how the
problem should be changed. This follow-up problem also gives feedback for answers.
Once the task is completed, you’ll see a link to a mildly entertaining 8-minute YouTube
video. Watch the video then immediately return to this window and follow the final set
of instructions.”
After Learning Phase and Before Testing Phase
“Now you’ll be tested on what you learned from prior practice. This final set of
problems will be similar to before except you’ll need to solve for the correct answer (a
number) instead of labeling the problem. You’re encouraged to use scratch paper. Don’t
simplify your answers. Also, there won’t be feedback this time, so do the best you can.
Thank you for your participation!”

Example problems exactly as listed in study (including indents and spacing):
Correct answers marked highlighted in grey. A-NC = addition rule with no cooccurring events; S = sufficient information; I = contains irrelevant information; M =
contains missing information.
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INTERVENTION
A-NC /S
A bag contains 6 balls in total: 2 red, 3 yellow, and 1 blue. If you randomly take
one ball out, what is the probability that you’ll get either 1 blue or 1 red?
a. Sufficient but with irrelevant information
b. Missing but no irrelevant information
c. Sufficient with no irrelevant information
d. Missing and with irrelevant information
IF CORRECT: Exactly. Since there are no flaws in this problem’s content,
there’s no need to fix it before problem solving. Given this is the case, the
following is the procedure for solving this particular problem.
There are 6 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability of
picking a blue is 1/6 and the probability of picking a red is 2/6. Lastly, because
either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not both, we add the
two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next problem.]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period:
IF A, B, or D:
That’s not quite right. In the problem there’s information about the total
number of balls in the bag, the number of blue and red balls within this
total, and the fact only one ball could be taken out, either blue or red. This
is the only information needed for solving this problem and there’s no
additional redundant or misleading information. Here’s how you would
solve this problem since it already had sufficient information:
There are 6 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability
of picking a blue is 1/6 and the probability of picking a red is 2/6. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not
both, we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]

A-NC /I
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A bag contains 4 balls in total: 2 red, 1 yellow, and 1 blue. If you randomly take
one ball out, what is the probability that you’ll get either 1 blue or 1 red if the blue
and red are much lighter than the yellow?
a. Missing and with irrelevant information
b. Missing but no irrelevant information
c. Sufficient but with irrelevant information
d. Sufficient with no irrelevant information
IF CORRECT:
Which statement(s) should be deleted to make this problem “Sufficient with no
irrelevant information?”
A bag contains 4 balls in total: 2 red, 1 yellow, and 1 blue. If you randomly take
one ball out, what is the probability that you’ll get either 1 blue or 1 red if the blue
and red are much lighter than the yellow?
a. Both b and c
b. “…if the blue and red balls are much lighter than the yellow”
c. “…in total…”
d. Another statement
IF CORRECT:
Exactly. Once the statement you selected is removed there will be no flaws in
this problem’s content. The following is the procedure for solving this
particular problem now that it’s ready to be solved.
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability of
picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a red is 2/4. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not both,
we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next problem.]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period.
IF A:
Although b is correct, the problem requires there be information
about the total number of balls. Without this information, the
problem would be unsolvable. Once the correct statement has
43

been removed, the following is the procedure for solving this
particular problem.
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the
probability of picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a
red is 2/4. Lastly, because either picking one color ball or another
can take place, but not both, we add the two probabilities. [Then
they move on to the next problem.]
IF C:
That’s not quite right. The problem requires there be information
about the total number of balls. Without this information, the
problem would be unsolvable. Answer b is correct because how
much the balls weigh is irrelevant in calculating the probability.
Once the statement in b has been removed, the following is the
procedure for solving this particular problem.
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the
probability of picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a
red is 2/4. Lastly, because either picking one color ball or another
can take place, but not both, we add the two probabilities. [Then
they move on to the next problem.]
IF D:
That’s not quite right. There aren’t any other statements in this
problem warranting concern than what’s reflected in the other
answering options. Answer b is correct because how much the
balls weigh is irrelevant in calculating the probability. Once the
statement in b has been removed, the following is the procedure for
solving this particular problem
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the
probability of picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a
red is 2/4. Lastly, because either picking one color ball or another
can take place, but not both, we add the two probabilities. [Then
they move on to the next problem.]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period.
IF A:
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That’s not quite right. Although this problem contains irrelevant
information, there’s still enough for problem solving. [They then go to the
second step of this problem.]
IF B:
That’s not quite right. Not only is there enough information to solve this
problem, but the problem also contains irrelevant information. [They then
go to the second step of this problem.]
IF D:
That’s not quite right. Although this problem contains enough
information for problem solving, there’s also irrelevant information.
[They then go to the second step of this problem.]
A-NC /M
A bag contains at least the following balls: 6 red, 1 yellow, and 1 blue. What is
the probability that, after randomly selecting one ball, you’ll get either 1 blue or 1
red?
a. Sufficient but with irrelevant information
b. Sufficient with no irrelevant information
c. Missing and with irrelevant information
d. Missing but no irrelevant information
IF CORRECT:
What content should be added to make this problem “Sufficient with
no irrelevant information?”
A bag contains at least the following balls: 6 red, 1 yellow, and 1 blue.
What is the probability that, after randomly selecting one ball, you’ll
get either 1 blue or 1 red?
a. That an additional ball needs to be withdrawn
b. Information about how many balls there are in total.
c. Either a or b but not both
d. Both a and b
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IF CORRECT:
Exactly. Once the statement you selected is added there will be no
flaws in this problem’s content. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
IF INCORRECT:
IF A:
That’s not quite right. For this problem there’s no need to
withdraw an extra ball. However, the statement about the total
number of balls does need to be added. Currently the problem
only clarifies balls we know exist in the bag. It doesn’t tell us
that’s all there is in total. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
IF C:
Although both statements shouldn’t be added, the choice between
the two isn’t arbitrary. For this problem, there’s no need to
withdraw an extra ball. However, the statement about the total
number of balls does need to be added. Currently the problem
only clarifies balls we know exist in the bag. It doesn’t tell us
that’s all there is in total. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
IF D:
Although b is correct, there’s no need to withdraw an extra ball in
this problem. [Then they move on to the next problem.]
IF INCORRECT:
IF A:
That’s not quite right. Although this problem lacks important information,
there’s still no irrelevant information in the problem. [They then go to the
second step of this problem.]
IF B:
That’s not quite right. There is there no irrelevant information in this
problem, and the problem lacks the necessary information. [They then go
to the second step of this problem.]
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IF C:
That’s not quite right. Although there’s no irrelevant information in this
problem, the problem still lacks the necessary information. [They then go
to the second step of this problem.]

CONTROL
A-NC / S
A bag contains 6 balls in total: 2 red, 3 yellow, and 1 blue. If you randomly
take one ball out, what is the probability that you’ll get either 1 blue or 1 red?
a. 3/6
b. This problem can’t be solved
c. 2/30
d. 16/36
IF CORRECT: [They move on to next problem]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period
IF B:
That’s not quite right. There is enough information to solve the problem.
Here’s the procedure for solving the problem:
There are 6 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability
of picking a blue is 1/6 and the probability of picking a red is 2/6. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not
both, we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
IF C OR D:
That’s not quite right. Here’s the procedure for solving the problem:
There are 6 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability
of picking a blue is 1/6 and the probability of picking a red is 2/6. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not
both, we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
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A-NC / I
A bag contains 4 balls in total: 2 red, 1 yellow, and 1 blue. If you randomly
take one ball out, what is the probability that you’ll get either 1 blue or 1 red if
the blue and red are much lighter than the yellow?
a. 10/16
b. 3/4
c. 2/12
d. This problem can’t be solved
IF CORRECT: [They move on to next problem]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period
IF A OR C:
That’s not quite right. Here’s the procedure for solving the problem:
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability
of picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a red is 2/4. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not
both, we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
IF D:
That’s not quite right. There is enough information to solve the problem.
Here’s the procedure for solving the problem:
There are 4 balls in total. Because there’s 1 blue and 2 red, the probability
of picking a blue is 1/4 and the probability of picking a red is 2/4. Lastly,
because either picking one color ball or another can take place, but not
both, we add the two probabilities. [Then they move on to the next
problem.]
A-NC /M
A bag contains at least the following balls: 2 red, 1 yellow, and 3 blue. What
is the probability that, after randomly selecting one ball, you’ll get either 1
blue or 1 red?
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a. 5/6
b. This problem can’t be solved
c. 6/30
d. 24/36
IF CORRECT: [They move on to next problem]
IF INCORRECT: Initiate review period
IF NOT B:
That’s not quite right. This problem can’t be solved. [Then they move on
to the next problem.]
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